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The 1985 U .S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition 
Treaty: A Superfluous Effort? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 1986, the Senate ratified the Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
(Supplementary Treaty) between the United States and the United Kingdom.! 
The Supplementary Treaty amended the Treaty of Extradition which the two 
nations adopted in 1972 (1972 Treaty).2 The primary impact of the Supple-
mentary Treaty was to effectively repeal the political offense exception (POE) 
contained in the 1972 Treaty.3 The political offense exception permitted per-
sons who were the subject of extradition4 requests to avoid extradition by 
establishing that their alleged offenses were political in nature.5 A similar POE 
is contained in more than ninety extradition treaties which the United States 
maintains with other countries.6 The Supplementary Treaty is the first extra-
dition agreement which seeks to narrow the scope of the POE.7 It has, accord-
ingly, come under attack as indicating a partisan approach to foreign policy.8 
I Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, June 26, 1986, United States-United 
Kingdom, EXEC. REP. No. I 99-17, 99th Cong., 2nd session (1986) [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. 
2 Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.l.A.S. No. 
8468 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977) [hereinafter 1972 Treaty]. 
3 Article V(c) of the 1972 Treaty provides that extradition will be denied if the requested party 
regards the offense for which extradition is sought as one of political character, or if the refugee 
proves that the motivation behind the extradition request is punishment for a political offense. 1972 
Treaty, supra note 2, at art. V(c). For a history of the political offense exception, see infra text 
accompanying notes 47-68. 
4 The Supreme Court defines extradition as "the surrender by one nation to another of an individual 
accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. 
Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). 
51972 Treaty, supra note 2, at art. V(l)(c)(i). 
6 See infra note 51. 
7 See Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom: Report from the Committee on Foreign 
Relations to Accompany Doc. 99-8, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), S384-5, June 26, 1986, at II [hereinafter 
Committee Report] (statement of Sen. Helms) ("[F]or the first time in history, a person fighting against 
extradition would not be able to present the political offense defense in a U.S. court."). 
8 See, e.g., United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 
99-8 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1985) S381-23, Sept. 18, 
1985, at 105 [hereinafter Senate Hearings], (prepared statement of Prof. C. H. Pyle, Mount Holyoke 
College). Specifically, Prof. Pyle stated, "[a]nd let's be realistic. This Treaty-and future treaties like 
it-are not directed at assisting 'democratic' governments with 'fair' legal systems, as the State De-
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The United States and United Kingdom appear to have adopted the Supple-
mentary Treaty in reaction to four extradition cases9 which involved members 
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).lo In each of these cases, the 
PIRA activist successfully avoided extradition to the United Kingdom by invok-
ing the political offense exception contained in the 1972 Treaty.ll Because the 
PIRA actively engages in terrorist12 activities directed against one of America's 
strongest allies, the United Kingdom, the Reagan Administration became con-
cerned about the United States' role in protecting such activities. 13 
partment claims. They are directed at helping our 'friends and allies' suppress any and all rebellions 
against their authority." Id.; see also No Way to Fight, Nat. L.J., June 16, 1986, at 14 (editorial): 
Id. 
If the administration wanted to wash its hands of politically motivated violence entirely-
uniformly extraditing Irish dissidents, Nicaraguan contras and Afghan rebels-it would at 
least be taking a principled position. But that's not what its treaty by treaty approach contem-
plates .... In foreign policy, no one expects governments to treat friends and foe alike. But 
American courts, in the exercise of police power over individuals, should not be enlisted into 
administering uneven and politically motivated justice. They should, instead, continue to 
neutrally administer the objective principles of a uniform political offense doctrine that is 
well grounded in this country's own revolutionary past. 
9 Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 R.P.A. slip op. (N.D. Cal. Oct.3, 1983), vacated, 783 F.2d 776, 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 271 (1986); Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
Matter of Mackin, 80 Cr. Mise. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re 
Extradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG at 3 (ND. Cal. May 11, 1979). For subsequent 
history of cases, see infra text accompanying notes 167-229 and infra note 14 for case cites. 
10 PI RA is an offshoot of the IRA. The separation officially took place at a Sinn Fin conference in 
Dublin in December of 1969, due to conflict within the IRA over the extent to which violence should 
be employed. PIRA is composed of the militant members who are committed to the use of terrorist 
tactics. See generally 5 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Ready Reference and Index, 427 (15th 
ed. 1983). See also McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The PIRA ... is an offshoot 
ofthe para military Irish Republican Army (IRA) ... [and] formed in protest to the perceived inefficacy 
of the IRA."). 
11 See infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text. 
12 McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1986) ("PIRA is unquestionably a 'terrorist' orga-
nization .... "). While no universally accepted definition of terrorism exists, see R. KUPPERMAN & D. 
TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT, REALITY, RESPONSE 14 (1979) (citing Fromkin, The Strategy of Terrorism, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS at 693 (july 1975» for one interpretation of terrorism to be: 
[V]iolence used in order to create fear; but is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, 
in turn, will lead somebody else-not the terrorist-to embark on some quite different 
program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires. Unlike 
the ... revolutionist, the terrorist therefore is always in the paradoxical position of undertak-
ing actions the immediate physical consequences of which are not particularly desired by him. 
!d.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (Supp. III 1985). The United States has defined an "act of terrorism" in 
the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism to be an act that: 
(a) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state; and 
(b) appears to be intended 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 
!d. 
13 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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While the Supplementary Treaty is the most direct method of ensuring that 
future PIRA activists will not escape prosecution in the United Kingdom, it is 
arguably not the only method by which they could be returned. Where the 
activist is a national of the United Kingdom, as was the case in three out of the 
four aforementioned PIRA cases,I4 the United States government could deport 
the activists under current immigration law. I5 Most importantly, a recent federal 
court interpretation of the Attorney General's power indicates that he or she 
may deport the activist directly to the United Kingdom, regardless of such 
activist's requested destination. I6 While the use of deportation to deliver PIRA 
refugees back to the United Kingdom may not be as direct a method as the 
Supplementary Treaty, it is nonetheless a viable and possibly less controversial 
exercise of power. Moreover, for those PIRA activists who are U.S. citizens, and 
hence not deportable, the most recent PIRA decision, Quinn v. Robinson, indi-
cates that they were probably already extraditable to the United Kingdom under 
the 1972 Treaty.I7 
Given current deportation law and the most recent judicial commentary on 
acts covered by the POE, the need for the Supplementary Treaty may have 
been a superfluous effort. This author does not suggest that deportation and 
extradition are wholly exchangeable procedures. Indeed, their procedures and 
purposes are very different. Is Given the particular facts surrounding PIRA 
activists, however, deportation can bring about the same result as extradition, 
while avoiding the negative ramifications associated with the Supplementary 
Treaty. 19 
This Comment begins with the background history of the Supplementary 
Treaty, including the origins and procedures of extradition, and the basic 
philosophy behind the political offense exception.20 The Comment will then 
look at the recent broad judicial interpretatipns of the political offense excep-
tion, which ultimately resulted in the Supplementary Treaty's creation.21 The 
Comment then examines the U.S.-U,K. Extradition and Supplementary Trea-
ties,22 and briefly discusses the criticisms of the Supplementary Treaty.23 
14 See IRA Suspect Sent to Ireland, N.Y. Times, Jan. I, 1982, at 2, col. 3 (referring to Mackin) 
[hereinafter IRA Suspect); McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986); Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 
938 (2d Cir. 1986). 
IS See infra notes 127-31 for grounds of deportation typically related to PIRA refugees. 
16 Doherty, 808 F.2d at 941. 
17 See 783 F.2d 776, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1986). 
I8 Compare infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text with notes 125-63 and accompanying text. 
19 For some criticisms of the Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, see infra notes 112-24 and 
accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 39-45, 105-11 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text. 
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The Comment next details how other measures, apart from the Supplemen-
tary Treaty, can achieve the goal of delivering PIRA refugees to the United 
Kingdom. 24 Finally, the Comment addresses the propriety of instituting depor-
tation measures when extradition is unavailable, and concludes with observa-
tions about the necessity of the Supplementary Treaty.25 
II. HISTORY OF EXTRADITION AND THE POE IN U.S.-U.K. EXTRADITION 
TREATIES 
A. Extradition and Its General Procedure 
Early instances of extradition26 were sometimes based merely on the premise 
of goodwill between sovereignsY Today the right of a foreign nation to obtain 
the extradition of an accused criminal is created solely by treaty.28 Such a treaty 
customarily provides for the reciprocal extradition of individuals who are pres-
ent within the territory of one of the nations but who have been accused of 
certain offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the other nation.29 
When the United States is the requested state, extradition begins with a formal 
request made for extradition by the requesting sovereign to the Department of 
State. 30 A U.S. magistrate then conducts preliminary proceedings and a hearing 
to determine whether the individual is extraditable. 31 The magistrate must 
determine whether (i) the requested individual is the person before the court; 
(ii) the offense charged is an extraditable offense under the treaty; (iii) the 
offense charged is a crime within the state where the hearing is being held and 
(iv) there is probable cause to believe that the individual before the court 
24 See infra notes 125-63 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 239-53 and accompanying text. 
26 See supra note 4 for the Supreme Court"s definition of extradition. See also M. BASSIOUNI, INTER-
NATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, 1,6 (1987) [hereinafter UNITED STATES 
EXTRADITION]. The term "extradition" is derived from the Latin "extradere" which means forceful 
return of a person to his sovereign. /d. 
27 UNITED STATES EXTRADITION, supra note 26, at 6. 
28 Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (S.D. Fla. 1959). See also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 
776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986); UNITED STATES EXTRADITION, supra note 26, at 32. Note, the Supreme Court 
in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933), held that according to international legal 
principles, there is no legal duty to extradite apart from treaty. [d. Hence, under 18 U.S.C. § 3181 
(Supp. III 1985), the United States extradites only when pursuant to a treaty with the requesting state. 
[d. 
29 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). 
30 See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). For a 
general discussion of the extradition procedure, see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 511-17 (1974) [hereinafter WORLD PUBLIC ORDER]. 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). 
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committed the offense charged. 32 Based on these findings, the magistrate either 
accepts or rejects the request, and no right of appeal attaches to his or her 
decision.33 
If the magistrate finds that the fugitive is extraditable, the charge is certified 
to the Secretary of State, who may then issue a warrant for the surrender of 
the fugitive upon request of the requesting state. 34 A petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus is the mechanism by which the defendant can seek review.35 The 
scope of the district court's review of the magistrate's extradition order on such 
a petition is very limited. The court must determine (1) whether the magistrate 
had jurisdiction, (2) whether the charged offense is within the treaty, and (3) 
whether there was evidence supporting the finding that there was reasonable 
ground to believe the accused guilty.36 If, on the other hand, a fugitive is found 
to be un-extraditable, the requesting State is not bound by res judicata37 from 
reinstituting another extradition request. 38 
B. 1972 Treaty Standards for Extradition 
On October 21,1972, the United States and the United Kingdom exchanged 
the instruments of ratification of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty in Washing-
ton D.C. 39 The 1972 Treaty provides that the United States and the United 
Kingdom must extradite individuals accused of a wide range of scheduled 
32 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 30, at 515. See also 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 944-45 (1968); Kircher, The Turning Point Approaches: The Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 549, 553 (1987). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982), the probable cause standard 
is defined to be: "[i]f, on such 'l hearing, ... the evidence [is] sufficient to sustain the charge under the 
provisions of the proper treaty and convention .... " Id. (emphasis supplied). 
"Fong Vue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1892) (citing Act of August 12, 1848, ch. 167, 
9 Stat. 302, Rev. Stat. 5270-74). See also Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920). The magistrates 
are granted special authority under various treaties and acts of Congress, and though they act in a 
judicial fashion, their actions are not a formal exercise of any part of the judicial power of the United 
States. No appeal from their decisions is given by the law under which they act, and hence no right 
of appeal exists. Id. 
34 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1982). 
35 See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981); 
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978); Matter of 
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981). 
36 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 
312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 542, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925); accord Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 626 
(9th Cir. 1984)); see also Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally 
Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice and a Proposed 
Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733, 750-55 (1969). 
37 Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1368 ("Not only must a judgment be final before it will have res judicata 
effect, but it also must have been on the merits .... The nature of an extradition proceeding is such 
that the merits of the fugitive's guilt or innocence are not explored."); Quinn, 783 F.2d at 786 n.3. 
38 Hooker, 573 F.2d at 1368; see, e.g., Mackin, 668 F.2d at 137. 
39 1972 Treaty, supra note 2. 
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offenses.4o The 1972 Treaty also provides for extradition in the case of any 
offense, attempt, or conspiracy which is punishable in each country by more 
than one year in prison or death, and is both a felony under United States law 
and extraditable under any U.K. law.41 Extradition is also granted for the act 
of impeding the arrest or prosecution of one who has committed an extraditable 
offense which is punishable under both United States and United Kingdom 
laws by imprisonment for a period of at least five years.42 
The 1972 Treaty also cotltains a political offense exception. This exception 
adheres to common international practice43 by barring the extradition of aliens 
who are accused of a politically related crime; Accordingly, under the 1972 
Treaty, extradition is denied when the offenses are considered "political" by 
the requested nation,44 or the requested individuals prove that their extradition 
is sought with the intent to try or punish them for political acts.45 It is this 
provision that was subseqUently diminished by the Supplementary Treaty.46 
C. Origin and Judicial Interpretation of the POE 
The political offense exception originated in the philosophical and political 
revolutions that occurred in Western Europe and America in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth cefituries.47 During this Enlightenment period, the notion 
was born that individuals have a right to "resort to political activism to foster 
political change."48 Actordingly, the idea emerged that protection snould be 
provided for the individual who flees a country after an unsucces~ful attempt 
40 [d. at Schedule. Some offenses included in the schedule are murder, manslaughter, rape, bigamy, 
kidnapping, theft, blackmail, robbery, burglary, arson, arid unlawful seiiure of aircraft. [d; 
41 [d. at art. 111(1)(2). 
42 [d. at art. 111(3). 
43 UNITED STATES EXTRADITION, supra note 26, at 384 ("The politicai offense exception is now a 
standard clause in almost all extradition treaties of the wbrld and is also specified in the national laws 
of many states."); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cit; 1986). 
44 1972 Treaty, supra note 2, at art. V(I)(c)(i). 
45 [d. at art. V(1)(c)(ii). 
46 See infra notes 105-i 1 and accompanying text. 
47 S,e, e.g., Quinn, 783 F.2d at 792 (citing Declaration des droits de I'homme et du Citoyen du 26 
aOllt 1789, art. 2 (Fr.), incorporated as LA PREAMBLE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1791 (Fr.), reprinted in LES 
CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 33 (S. Godechot ed. 1970) (declaring as an inalienable 
right "Ia resistance a I'oppression"); LA CONSTITUTION DE 1793, art. 120 (Fr.), reprinted in LES CONSTI-
TU1"IONS DE LA FRANtE DEPUIS 1789, supra, at 79, 91 (France "donne asile aux etrangets bannis de 
luer patrie pour la cause de la Iiberte."); The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) 
("[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People 
to alter or to abolish it .... "); see j. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. XIX 
(T. Cook ed. 1947); j.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(R. McCallum ed. 1948)). 
48 Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 
617, 622 (1981); see also Kulman, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes: The Proposed 
United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 755, 757 (1986). 
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to overthrow the country's tyrannic government.49 The Jacobean Constitution 
of 1793 evidenced the first proclamation of such a right.50 This political 'crimes 
defense subsequently became a provision of over ninety extradition treaties that 
the United States entered into with other nations,51 and is common ,to extradi-
tion treaties of most western nations.52 
One commentator53 has suggested that the wide acceptance of the POE lies 
in the decision of the western nations to avoid committing themselves, by treaty, 
to use of legal means to aid other nations' suppression of any rebellions.54 As a 
corollary to this rationale, these nations have not wanted to be associated with 
complicity in "victors' justice."55 Since the victor in a struggle for power deter-
mines the criminality of criminal offenses, it is wise foreign policy not to con-
tribute to the vengeful actions of the victorious group.56 Finally, the prevalence 
of a political crimes defense in the United States fosters an "appropriate pubiic 
policy" for a country that is comprised of immigrants and identifies itself as "a 
haven for political refugees of all kinds."57 
1. British Origins 
Because a "political offense" is judicially determined through statutory in.ter-
pretation, case law has become crucial in evaluating the ultimate reach of the 
POE. Over the years, U.S. courts have adopted the basic parameters of the 
political offense exception articulated in British decisions. 
The seminal case in the United Kingdom defining a political offense is In re 
Castioni. 58 In that case, the Swiss Government requested the extradition of 
Angelo Castioni, a Swiss national who had shot and killed a Sta,te council 
49 Kulman. supra note 48, at 757. 
50 Declaration Des Droits Naturels, Civils et Politiques Des Hommes, 1793, art. 120 (Fr. 1793); 
reprinted in LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 33 (S. Gedechot ed. 1970). Article 120 
provides in pertinent part, "donne asile aux etrangers bannis de leurs pays pour la cause de la liberte" 
["grants asylum to foreigners banished from their countries for the cause of freedom"]. Id. See also C. 
VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL QFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 9 (1980). 
51 See Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 99 (statement of Prof. C. H. Pyle); see also WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER, supra note 30, at 371. For a list of the nations that have entered into bilateral extradition 
treaties with the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982) (for example, the list includes Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Fiji, Paraguay, India, Mauritius, and Zambia). Id. 
52 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 99 (statement of Prof. C.H. Pyle). See also Committee Report, supra 
note 7, at 14 (statement of Sen. Helms) ("This doctrine has been carried forward in all Western 
democracies until the present day."). 
53 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 99 (statement of Prof. C.H. Pyle). 
54Id. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. For a discussion arguing that there are serious problems with the theoretical purposes and 
justifications of the POE in the United States, see Shapiro, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need 
to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.V.U. L. REv. 654 (1986). 
58 [1891]1 Q.B. 149. 
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member in the course of an armed attack upon a municipal building. 59 The 
court formulated what is known as the "incidence test." This test requires that 
in order for the political offense exception to apply, the offensive act must be 
carried out "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" a widespread political 
uprising.60 The court found that Castioni's actions were part of political 
disturbances61 and held him to be unextraditable. 
2. U.S. Case Law Concerning the POE 
As stated above, the United States has adopted the basic premise of the 
original Castioni incidence test in determining whether conduct falls within the 
POE. The first U.S. case to use the incidence test was In re Ezeta. 62 There, the 
Salvadoran Government requested the extradition of several refugees accused 
of murder and robbery. The refugees, however, argued that the offenses were 
political, since they were committed in an unsuccessful attempt to thwart a 
revolution.63 The court denied extradition, finding that the acts were "commit-
ted during the progress of actual hostilities between contending forces."64 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that such acts were "closely identified"65 with the 
uprising "in an unsuccessful effort to suppress it."66 
Over the years, U.S. courts have further defined the incidence test, formu-
lating a two-pronged political offense test through the interpretation of both 
the Castioni and Ezeta decisions. Each requirement must be satisfied before the 
offender can invoke the exception. First, there must be "an uprising or other 
violent political disturbance at the time of the charged offense."67 Second, the 
59 Id. at 150-51. Specifically, the people of the town of Bellizona had been dissatisfied for some time 
with the then-controlling government. When that government refused to revise the constitution after 
being presented with the requisite seven thousand signature petition in accordance with that consti-
tution. the townspeople stormed the town palace. During this uprising, Castioni shot and killed a 
government official. He escaped to England, where he was arrested and committed for extradition on 
a charge of murder. Castioni admitted to the killing but claimed exemption under the Extradition Act 
of 1870, which had an extradition exception for acts of "a political character." Unfortunately, the Act 
neglected to define the term. Id. 
6°ld. at 156. 
611d. at 166. 
62 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). 
63Id. at 995. 
64Id. at 997. 
65Id. at 1002. 
66 Id. 
67 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 797 (9th Cir. 1986). Facilitating a finding of unextraditability, 
"American courts generally will take judicial notice "f a state of uprising." Id. at n.18 (citing Karadzole 
v. Artvkovic, 247 F.2d 198,204 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (noting that 
the district court took proper judicial notice of political struggle in Croatia); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. 
Supp. 459, 462 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (extradition court took judicial notice of revolutionary movement in 
Cuba)). 
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charged offense must be "incidental to, in the course of, or in the furtherance 
of the uprising."68 
III. EVENTS LEADING Up TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY 
A. Criticism of the POE 
While the POE followed traditional extradition treaty practice, definitional 
problems surrounding the exception encouraged its diminishment. First, the 
United States incidence test, as first applied in In re Ezeta, became the subject 
of some criticism.69 Specifically, the two-pronged test was criticized as being both 
overinclusive and underinclusive, as it: 
tends to exempt from extradition all crimes occurring during a 
political disturbance, but no offenses which were not contempora-
neous with an uprising. The strict adherence to the requirement 
that the act be tied to an uprising disturbance may operate to 
exclude from protection many individual acts of legitimate political 
resistance .... [T]he overinclusive aspect of the approach may op-
erate to protect common criminals simply because their crimes occur 
during times of political disorder.7° 
Thus, the POE was not a consistent method of protection. 
Additionally, increased occurrences of terrorist activities fueled concern over 
the political offense exception. The Reagan Administration feared that the POE 
would prevent large numbers of terrorists found within the United States from 
being brought to justice.7l The rationale behind this fear was that the political 
offense test had failed to effectively discern the difference between political 
rebellion, which is to be protected, and terrorism, which is to be punished. 72 
68 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 797 (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant PLO 
member failed to establish that a bombing of a market in an Isreali city was incidental to PLO's 
objectives, and hence was not "incidental to" a political disturbance); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 
173 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant was charged with crime of fraudulent bankruptcy, which court held 
was not a crime "incidental to" an uprising); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 
(5th Cir. 1971) (defendant was a former Peruvian government official who was charged with embez-
zlement, which the court held was not a crime "incidental to" an uprising)). 
69 See, e.g., Lubet & Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193,203-04 (1980); Eain, 641 F.2d at 519-20. 
70 Lubet & Czaczkes, supra note 69, at 203-04. 
71 See Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 260-64 (statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the 
Department of State). But see id. at 94, (statement of Sen. Pell) (Over the forty year period of 1945-
1985, the total number of cases seeking extradition was approximately 2000, "but of that 2000, only 
4 cases exist where we refused to return the defendant based on political crime."). 
72 The court in Eain, 641 F.2d at 520-21, commented on this distinction: "The definition of a 
'political disturbance,' with its focus on organized forms of aggression such as war, rebellion and 
revolution, is aimed at acts that disrupt the political structure of a State, and not the social structure 
that established the government." [d. Thus, according to the court, political acts did not include "cold 
310 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XII, No.1 
Exacerbating the concern surrounding the reach of the POE were the extra-
dition Cases of four PIRA activists. 73 It is because of these four initial decisions 
that the Reagan Administration set the Supplementary Treaty machinery into 
motion.74 
B. The PIRA Cases 
In the first PIRA case, In re Extradition of McMullen,'5 a United States magis-
trate considered the extradition of a PIRA member, Peter Gabriel John Mc-
Mullen, who had been involved in a bombing of British Army barracks. in a 
strict application of the facts to the test requirements, the magistrate denied 
extradition because (1) the bombing occurred at a time that a political uprising 
was in existence in Northern Ireland, arid (2) the bombing was incidental to the 
PIRA's political objectives.76 
The next case also involved a narrow application of the incidence test. In 
Matter of Mackin,77 the magistrate refused to extradite Desmond Mackin, a PIRA 
member charged with wounding a British soldier in a gun battle. Applying the 
two-pronged incidence test, the magistrate determined that Mackin's act was of 
a political character. The magistrate concluded that: "(1) at the time of the 
offenses charged against Mackin the Provisional Irish Republican Party (PIRA) 
was conducting a political uprising in the portion of Belfast where the offenses 
were committed; (2) that Mackin was an active member of PIRA; and (3) that 
the offenses committed against the British soldier were incidental to Mackin's 
role in the PIRA's political uprising in Belfast."78 
In Matter of Doherty,'9 Joseph Patrick Doherty, a member of PIRA, and three 
other PIRA members, took over a house on May 2, 1980 in order to hide out 
and then attack a convoy of British soldiers. In the exchange of gunfire that 
ensued, a British Army captain was killed and Doherty was arrested and charged 
with murder. While awaiting a court's decision on charges including the murder 
of the British Army officer, Doherty escaped from prison and entered the 
United States illegally. Two days after arriving in the United States, the United 
blooded murder of civilians incidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent a direct link 
between the perpetrator, a political organization's political goals, and the specific act." [d. See also 
supra note 12 for a definition of terrorism. 
73 See supra note 9 for citations to the PIRA cases. 
74 See Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 282 (prepared statement of Dante Simbulan, Executive Director 
of the Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Phillipines) ("It is because of these four cases that 
the Supplementary Treaty came about."). 
75 No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132 CONGo REC. S9146 (daily ed. July 
16, 1986). 
76 [d. at 6. 
77668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). 
78 Id. at 125. 
79 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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Kingdom Government convicted Doherty in abstentia for murder and other 
offenses. The United Kingdom then requested that he be extradited. 
In a significant departure from the literal reading of the incidence test, the 
court determined that the existence of a political conflict and an offense com-
mitted "during the course of" and "in furtherance of" that struggle is only the 
beginning of the analysis required to determine extraditability.80 Indeed, in 
finding that the facts of this case presented "an assertion of the political offense 
exception in its most classic form,"8! the court held that the only issue in need 
of resolution was whether the POE was inappropriate because PIRA engaged 
in a "sporadic and informal mode of warfare." 82 
In analyzing whether the POE did apply to the acts of the PIRA, the court 
explained that the "nature," "structure," and "mode of internal discipline within 
the organization" are crucial considerations.83 That is, the more structured an 
organization is, the more likely its acts will be considered political.84 The court 
ruled that the POE did apply to the acts of the PIRA, noting that the PIRA 
had an "organization, discipline, and command structure that distinguishes it 
from more amorphous groups like the Black Liberation Army .... "85 The court 
further delineated a broad scope of the POE, indicating that the fact that the 
PIRA's acts were unlikely to achieve its objectives did not "deprive its act~ of 
their political character. "86 
The fourth case began on September 29, 1982, when a United States mag-
istrate found William Joseph Quinn, a U.S. citizen, extraditable to the United 
Kingdom based on six PIRA-related bombing incidents in England.87 The mag-
istrate based his decision on the finding that Quinn had failed to show that he 
was a member of the PIRA,88 had failed to prove that the alleged acts furthered 
PIRA goals, and failed to show that the bombings were committed in further-
ance of a political uprising. 89 Quinn then filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
80/d. at 274. 
81 Id. at 276. 
82Id. 
S3Id. 
84Id. ("[I]t would be most unwise ... to extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every 
fanatic group or individual with loosely defined political objectives who commit acts of violence in the 
name of those so called political objectives."). 
85/d. The court specifically observed that PIRA's "discipline and command structure operates even 
after its members are imprisoned." Id. 
S6/d. 
87 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783-85 (9th Cir. 1986). 
88Id. at 785. Specifically, the magistrate held that, "Quinn's evidence of his membership in IRA was 
of little weight since he had failed to demonstrate that he was a member of the PIRA or of the Active 
Service Unit that allegedly conducted the bombings." /d. 
89/d. The magistrate further held that, "because. [Active Service Units] often acted without 
guidance from superiors, their targets may have been chosen for personal reasons ... rather than ... 
political motivations." The magistrate went on to find that the bombings were not in "furtherance of" 
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corpus. In granting this petition, the district court did not address all of Quinn's 
arguments because it held that the offenses were "non-extraditable political 
offenses. "90 
In an extremely liberal interpretation of the political incidence test, the district 
court found three legal errors in the analysis of the magistrate. First, the court 
held that Quinn was not required to "show ... membership in an uprising 
group."91 Second, the court held that the acts are not required to be "politically 
efficacious or directed by a hierarchy within PIRA" in order to meet the "inci-
dental to" requirement. 92 Third, the court disagreed with the magistrate who 
found that the bombings were not political because they were directed at civilians 
rather than the government the PIRA was attempting to displace.93 In contrast, 
the court reasoned that the motive of the acts was to influence the government, 
and the potential harm to civilians was merely incidental to those acts. 94 Hence, 
the district court held that Quinn's actions were protected activity.95 
It is interesting to note that not only did the court deny extradition in these 
four cases, but with each subsequent case, even though presented with similar 
fact patterns, the courts seemed to extend the POE's scope by increasing the 
number of factors that may be considered political. From the straightforward 
requirements in Mackin and McMullen of an uprising and an act incidental to 
that uprising, the court later expanded the protection of POE to include acts 
of dubious circumstances. The most tenuous extension of the POE appeared in 
the Quinn96 case where the court held that criminal acts need not have been 
ordered by a hierarchy within the PIRA, thus allowing protection of acts that 
may be of a personally revengeful nature. Indeed, the court went so far as to 
hold that membership in an uprising group is not required. 97 Equally tenuous 
was that court's conclusion that acts need not be effective in promoting the 
political goals of the PIRA in order to remain protected.98 
IV. THE REPEAL OF THE POE VIA THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY 
After U.S. courts denied the United Kingdom four extradition requests for 
PIRA activists, the Reagan Administration became both concerned and embar-
the uprising because their efficacy in promoting PIRA's goals were not considered by the hierarchy 
of PIRA. Finally, the magistrate held that there was no "direct link" between the act and a political 
purpose because the act was aimed at civilians rather than the government. /d. at 785-86. 
YO Id. at 786. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93 !d. 
<)4 Id. 
YO Id. 
96 783 F.2d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 1986). 
97 !d. 
98Id. 
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rassed. 99 In light of the cooperative stance British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher had taken with regard to the U.S. fight against international terrorism, 
Reagan was eager to reciprocate by eliminating the 1972 Treaty provisions 
which safeguarded PIRA refugees. loo 
In response, the Reagan Administration drew up the Supplementary 
TreatylOl which delineated the offenses of political character which would no 
longer be protected. lo2 President Reagan announced the purposes of the Sup-
plementary Treaty in a letter to the Senate. Specifically, he deemed the Sup-
plementary Treaty to be "a significant step in improving law enforcement 
cooperation and combatting terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the 
political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists 
•.•• "103 In addition, Secretary Schultz heralded the Supplementary Treaty as a 
"significant step to improve law enforcement cooperation and counter the threat 
of international terrorism and other crimes of violence."lo4 
The Supplementary Treaty effectively negates the POE by stripping the 
political character away from an entire schedule of offenses that are normally 
associated with political revolution. 105 Acts included in the Supplementary 
99 L.A. Daily J.,June 13, 1986, at 22, col. 4 ("State and Justice officials said it was an embarrassment 
that U.S. courts in recent years have denied extradition for four alleged IRA terrorists."). 
100 !d. ("Pressured by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to repay her support of the U.S. bombing 
of Libya, President Reagan had made passage of the [Supplementary] extradition treaty a top priority 
of his administration this year."); see also President's Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the Senate Majority Leader, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 524 (Apr. 28, 
1986): 
As Great Britain demonstrated once again last week, she is our staunchest Ally in the battle 
against international terrorism. Rejection of the [Supplementary] Treaty would be viewed by 
the British-and the world at large-as a weakening of U.S. resolve. This must not happen. 
Indeed, we see Senate ratification of this Supplemental Treaty as a key element of our wider 
efforts to promote greater international cooperation. 
[d.; see also 1986 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 379 ("President Reagan had asked for quick Senate approval of 
the treaty as a sign of gratitude to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for her support of the April 14 
U.S. bombing raid against Libya."). 
101 Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1. 
102 !d. art. I. 
103 President's Transmittal Letter to the Senate, 131 CONGo REC. S9696, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1104 (1985) [hereinafter President's Transmittal Letter]. 
104 [d. reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1104 (1985) (letter from Secretary of State George 
Schultz accompanying the Treaty). 
105 Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, at art. I. The Supplementary Treaty provides: 
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be regarded as an 
offense of a political character: 
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have an obligation pursuant to a multi-
lateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their 
competent authorities for decision as to a prosecution; 
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; 
[d. 
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; 
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, 
or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person; 
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice 
of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense. 
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Treaty as exemptions from the POE include murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
assault causing grievous bodily harm, and offenses involving the use of an 
explosive or firearin.106 The Supplementary Treaty also provides the framework 
of an objective test to determine extraditability. Specifically, the evidence of 
criminality against the defendant must be such that it would be sufficient to 
jU'stify trial in the requested state, if the act had been committed there. 107 
Notably, the Supplementary Treaty as ratified in 1986 was not the same treaty 
that was first submitted to the Senate in 1985. One change was to shorten the 
list of crimes that would be eliminated from the POE.IOB The Senate also pro-
vided additional safeguards for the alien via a savings clause. This clause pro-
vid'es that notwithstanding any other provision of the Supplementary Treaty, 
the extradition request will be refused if the accused can establish before com-
petent judicial authority (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the extra-
dition request was made "with a view to try or punish him on account of his 
... political opinions."109 
Also, if the accused can show that he or she will be "prejudiced at his trial or 
punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his ... 
political opinions," the extradition request will be denied. 110 Both parties to the 
106/d. 
107 [d. at art. 2: 
!d. 
Nothi"g ill this S~pplementary Treaty shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to 
extradite if the judicial authority of the requested Party determines that the evidence of 
criminality presented is not sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the treaty. 
The evidence of criminality must be such as, according \0 the law of the requested Party, 
would justify committal for trial if the offense had been committed in the territory of the 
requested Party. 
Note that this provisi?n has been interpreted as requiring a showing of probable cause. See Committee 
Report, supra note 7, at 7: 
!d. 
~t is fundamental that in an extradition hearing the issue before t\J.e court is probable cause 
.... [T]he purpose is to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to bind the individual 
over for trial, or to return him or her to complete an outstanding sentence in the requesting 
country. [Thus,] a person sought for extradition can introduce evidence on the question of 
probable cause. 
lOB Compare Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, at art. I with Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 
June 25, 1985, Uhited States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1104 (1985) at 
art. 1 [hereinafter 1985 Treaty]. Itell's in article I of the 1985 Treaty not included under article 1 of 
the S;"pplernentary Treaty il1~lude property damage, possession of firearms with the intent to endanger 
life, and conspiracy to cause an explosion. See 1985 Treaty, supra, at art. 1. Other offenses were 
qualified under the 1986 version of the Treaty; manslaughter was changed to "voluntary," and unlawful 
serious, detention was quali!ied as "serious." See Supplementary Treaty, supra note \, at art. 1. 
109 Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, at art. 3(a). See also Lubet & Czaczkes, supra note 69, at 203. 
Traditionally, courts have denied making such foreign policy determinations. This article requires the 
judicial branch to ignore its l6ngstanding practice of failing to inquire into the motives and processes 
of the req\lesting government; at least when that government is the United Kingdom. Lubet & 
Czaczkes, supra note 69, at 203. 
110 Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, at art. 3(a). 
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extradition proceeding have the right to appeal this particular determination 
within thirty days of the decision.'" 
At first glance, this savings clause seems quite similar in ideology to the POE. 
The difference, however, lies in the fact that while the POE relates to the political 
nature of the act itself, this provision relates to the political opinions of the 
accused or the prejudice of the requesting party's judicial process. 
Overall, on its face, the Supplementary Treaty appears to directly address 
the Reagan Administration's concern with PIRA refugees. Since the Supple-
mentary Treaty arguably eliminates from the POE those acts of violence typical 
of the PIRA, the Treaty significantly improves the chances that no PIRA refugee 
will escape prosecution in the United Kingdom. Prior to the signing of the 
Supplementary Treaty, however, the Senate criticized its provisions in ratifica-
tion hearings. 
V. CRITICISMS DISCUSSED IN THE TREATY RATIFICATION HEARINGS 
The most universal concern among critics is that the Supplementary Treaty 
<:reates an anomalous situation whereby the United States will limit protection 
of political activists with only one country, the United Kingdom. ll2 The same 
acts that are not protected by the POE when the requesting State is the United 
Kingdom, are protected when the requesting State is any of the other States 
with which the United States has extradition relations. During ratification hear-
ings, critics raised this concern and likened it to the fundamental isslle of 
fairness; i.e., that similarly situated people should have similar rights. Il3 
Critics are also concerned with the United States' adoption of a treaty-by-
treaty approach to altering the POE. By selectively emasclliating the POE, the 
executive branch implies that nations not chosen for such supplementary treaties 
do not have governments that are sufficiently "democratic" or "fair."1l4 To do 
\11 Id. at art. 3(b). 
112 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 289. (statement of Prof. M.C. Bassiouni) (,,[T]he same 
<lcts of violence would not be part of the 'political offense' exception if the requesting state was the 
U,K., but they would be if it is any of the 100 other gtates with which the U.S. has extradition 
relations."); id. at 359, (prepared statemenr of Rep. Rodino) ("Traditionally, all nations with which we 
have had extradition treaties have been subject to the same policy."). 
1\3 Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the judiciary, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 159 (1985) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (prepared statement of Gordon B. Baldwin) 
("If fairness alone is the standard ... the answer is obvious. Similar people in similar situations ought 
to have similar legal rights."); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 289 (prepared statement of Prof. 
M.e. B<lssiouni) ("The same exclusions do not apply to other persons who commit the same acts in 
other states with which the United States has extradition treaties .... "). 
114 Conversely, those nations chosen are seemingly given approval by the United States. Senator 
Joseph Biden commented that the Supplementary Treaty makes the '~udgment that the current British 
system in Northern Ireland is in fact a legitimate and good system. If we pass the Treaty, we are 
codifying that system." l'i'.Y, Times, Aug, 2, 1985, at 4, col. I. 
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SO, it is suggested, involves unwise "favored nation" determinations. ll5 One critic 
has observed that "[t]his could either lead to the alienation of that government, 
or worse, to pressures upon our government to enter such agreements with 
states who truly do not meet the criteria."1l6 
Several constitutional issues also surround the Supplementary Treaty. Since 
the acts in question have not involved the United States as a requesting State 
and have exclusively involved persons engaged in the rebellion in Northern 
Ireland, the exclusions have been referred to as the "IRA exclusions."ll7 Ac-
cordingly, the Supplementary Treaty is criticized as being violative of the equal 
protection clause of the fifth amendment. IIB 
The Supplementary Treaty also arguably violates the Constitution by its 
retroactivity. I 19 Political refugees previously held un extraditable under the POE 
would now be extraditable if the United Kingdom were to reinstitute a r~­
quest. 120 Critics suggest that this retroactivity violates "both constitutional pro-
hibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder." 121 
The Supplementary Treaty is also subject to criticism because it takes power 
from the judiciary and shifts that power to the executive branch. By delineating 
which offenses are not covered by the POE, the executive branch has predeter-
mined the answers to questions of law and fact related to individual liberty. 
115 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 105 (statement of Prof. C.H. Pyle); see generally id. at 413-16 
(statement of Morton Halperin), 359 (prepared statement of Rep. Rodino) ("Ratification of the pro-
posed Treaty with the United Kingdom could very well lead to requests from other countries to rewrite 
their extradition treaties, putting us in the difficult position of determining which of our friends and 
allies have democratic governments and just legal systems."). 
116 Kircher, supra note 32, at 566. 
117 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 290 (prepared statement of Prof. M.C. Bassiouni). See also id. at 
281 (prepared statement of D. Simbulan) ("[I]t is essentially an anti-IRA treaty .... "). See supra note 
I 0 for an explanation of the relationship of PIRA to IRA. 
118 [d. at 289 (prepared statement of Prof. M.C. Bassiouni) ("With respect to the 'equal protection' 
violation, it is apparent on the face of this category of exclusions, that it is aimed exclusively at those 
persons who are charged with committing such violations under U.K. law. The same exclusions do 
not apply to other persons who commit the same acts in other states with which the U.S. has extradition 
treaties and who would still continue to benefit from the 'political offense exception."'). See Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Aliens are protected by those provisions which refer to "persons" 
rather than "citizens." Accordingly, they receive the protection of the Bill of Rights, and, specifically, 
the right to equal protection. [d. 
119 Article 5 of the Supplementary Treaty provides: 
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or after this Sup-
plementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this Supplementary Treaty shall not apply 
to an offense committed before this Supplementary Treaty enters into force which was not 
an offense under the laws of both contracting Parties at the time of its commission. 
Supplementary Treaty, supra note I, at art. 5. 
120 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
121 Kircher, supra note 32, at 563 n.90 (citing 132 CONGo REc. S9153-60 (daily ed. July 16, 1986»; 
see also Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 528-30 (statement of Francis Boyle, Professor of Law, University 
of Illinois). 
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Such questions, the critics argue, are constitutionally reserved for the judi-
ciary.122 
Another significant problem relates to the purported conflict of interest be-
tween the executive's authority to rewrite the POE and conduct foreign policy. 
One commentator has bluntly stated that it is simply inconceivable that, as a 
political matter, the Department of State would decline to extradite a person to 
the United Kingdom on the ground that the individual would be persecuted or 
would not get a fair trial in British courts. 123 Thus, the proper application of 
the POE is likely to be inhibited by political pressures typically placed on the 
executive branch. 
Finally, the Supplementary Treaty is criticized as being overbroad, since it 
eliminates from protection all acts typical of revolutions, as well as terrorism. 
One critic went so far as to point out that under the Supplementary Treaty, the 
revolutionaries who led America to its independence would have been extra-
ditable. 124 
In sum, the negative ramifications of the Supplementary Treaty reach both 
domestic and international proportions. Such consequences explain why other 
methods of delivering PIRA refugees to the United Kingdom may be preferable. 
Indeed, the use of deportation may be one solution to the problem. 
VI. DEPORTATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXTRADITION 
A. Deportation Proceedings in General 
Deportation is a civil proceeding used to remove foreign nationals present in 
the United States who are deemed undesirable by statutory definition. 125 De-
122 See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 113, at 91, where Christopher Blakesley states: 
[E]limination of the political offense exception will undermine the role of the judiciary in an 
area which the constitution and legal tradition require that the judiciary playa role. When 
questions of fact and law related to individual liberty are at issue, the judiciary is the consti-
tutionally mandated institution to decide. To undermine this role ... tends to weaken the 
principle of the constitutional separation of powers. 
Id. at 91. See also Id. at 159 (prepared statement of Gordon B. Baldwin) ("I do not believe the 
Department of State is institutionally equipped to make principled decisions about the merits of any 
particular individual's claim to be immune from extradition."); but see id. at 157 ("[W]hen to allow the 
political offense exception is also a foreign policy decision, which should be made by the executive 
branch."). 
123 /d. at 123 (statement of John F. Murphy). 
124 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 779-80 (app. A(l) to prepared statement of Prof. Keara O'Demp-
sey). 
125 Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ("It is thoroughly established that Congress has 
power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The 
determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor 
is the deportation a punishment, it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it 
does not want."). 
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portable aliens are statutorily defined on numerous grounds. 126 Grounds which 
could apply to PIRA refugees include membership in any of the following 
classes: 
(1) aliens who at the time of application for admission are not in possession 
of a valid entry document and passport;127 
(2) aliens convicted of, or who admit to, committing a crime of moral turpi-
tude; 128 
(3) aliens convicted of two or more offenses (other than purely political 
offenses) for which the aggregate sentences are greater than or equal to five 
years;129 or 
(4) aliens who advocate or are affiliated with an organization that advocates 
the propriety of assaulting or killing any officer of any organized government 
because of the officer's official character,130 or the unlawful damage of prop-
erty.l3l 
Because PIRA activists are frequently unable to obtain legally the required 
travel documents, both from the United Kingdom and the United States, pro-
vision (1) above often applies. Indeed, this was a ground for deportation in 
both the Dohertyl32 and McMullen l33 cases. After an initial finding of a lack of 
the proper paperwork, the other aforementioned grounds of deportation may 
be used to augment the United States' position in the deportation proceeding. 134 
Perhaps the most universally applicable ground for the future deportation of 
PIRA activists would be (4) mentioned above. 13s Given that the PIRA's goal of 
126 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I), any alien found to be "exclud-
able" under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982) at the time of entry is held to be deportable. Id. 
[d. 
127 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) reads as follows: 
IAliens] who at the time of application for admission are not in the possession of a valid 
unexpired immigration visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid 
entry document required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable 
travel document, or document of identity and nationality, if such document is required under 
the regulations issued by the Attorney General pursuant to section 1181 (a) of this title. 
12R 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(9) reads in pertinent part: aliens "convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude ... or aliens who admit having committed such a crime, or ... admit committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements of such a crime .... " Id. 
129 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) reads in pertinent part: "aliens who have been convicted of two or more 
offenses (other than purely political offenses), ... regardless of whether the offenses involved moral 
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences were five years or more." Id. 
130 8 V.S.c. § 1182(28)(F)(ii) reads in pertinent part: "aliens who advocate, teach, or are members 
of or are affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches ... the duty, necessity, or propriety 
of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers ... of the Government of the United 
States or any other organized government, because of his or their official character." Id. 
lSI 8 U.S.C. § 1182(28)(F)(iii). 
132 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1986). 
133 McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1986). 
134 See, e.g., Doherty, 808 F.2d at 940 n.1 (additional grounds for deportation included 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251(a)(I), 1182(a)(9), I I 82(a)(l0), 1182(a)(27), 1182(a)(28)(F)(ii» (see supra notes 127-30 for lan-
guage). 
135 See supra note 130. 
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ousting British rule in Northern Ireland is largely effectuated through directed 
actions against law enforcement and other officers of the U.K. government, it 
is arguable that all PIRA refugees are subject to deportation based on this one 
ground alone. Curiously, however, only the Doherty case employed this ground 
of deportation.!36 
Deportation proceedings begin with the issuance of an "order to show cause" 
why the alien should not be deported.!37 The order informs the alien of the 
nature of the proceedings, the factual allegations supporting his deportability, 
the alleged statutory violations, and requires the alien to appear before an 
Immigration Judge (IJ) for a hearing at a specified time and place.!38 Signifi-
cantly, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) can arrest and take 
into custody any alien whom it believes is in the country in violation of the law 
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. 139 
The alien is then brought before an immigration officer for examination. If 
the officer determines that a prima facie case exists that the alien illegally 
entered the United States, the government begins formal deportation proceed-
ings (unless it grants permission for the alien to depart voluntarily).!40 The INS 
may detain an arrested alien, release the alien under specific conditions, or set 
bond.!4! The alien has the right to file a habeas corpus action in a federal district 
court, challenging the government's detention or bond decision.!42 
Typically, appeals are taken from a deportation hearing by the Boarq of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).!43 The BIA's decision is based on the record of 
the deportation hearing, the counsel briefs, and oral argument, if petitioner 
requests.!44 While the BIA's decision is administratively fiqal, the alien may try 
to appeal it judicially.!45 
Under the INA, the alien must first exhaust the administrative appeals avail-
able.!46 The alien is given six months from the final order of deportation to 
136 Doherty, 808 F.2d at 940 n.l. 
137 8 C.F.R. § 242.I(a) (1986). 
138 8 C.F.R. § 242.I(b) (1986). 
139 8 U.s.C. § 1252(a) (1982). 
140 Under the provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 96-212, § 244(e), 94 
Stat. 102,8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) [hereinafter the INA], the Attorney General is authorized, in his discretion, 
to grant voluntary departure to an alien who is otherwise subject to deportation. Under voluntary 
deportation, the alien may choose his or her destination.ld.; see, e.g., Jain v. INS, 612 F.2d 683, 685-
86 (2d Cir. 1979); Strantzalis v. INS, 465 F.2d 1016, 1017 (3d Cir. 1972). It should be emphasized, 
however, that voluntary deportation is a privilege, not a right. See Rizzi y. Murff, 171 F. Supp 362, 
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Von Kleczkowski v. Watkins, 71 F. Supp 429, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Mackin 
eventually departed the United States using this method. See IRA Suspect, supra note 14. 
1.1 INA, supra note 140, at § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982). 
142 !d. 
1.38 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1986). 
144 8 C.F.R. § 3.5 (1983). 
145 8 C.F.R. § 3.I(d)(2) (1983). The INA under 8 U.s.C. § II05(a) (1982) authorizes the judiciary to 
have jurisdiction over certain decisions appealed from the BIA. 
146 8 U.S.C. § l105(a)(c) (1982). 
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petition for review in the Court of Appeals. 147 The Court of Appeals' scope of 
review is limited to (1) determining whether the proceeding was conducted in 
an arbitrary, capricious, or illegal manner and (2) whether the proceeding 
complied with notions of due process. 148 The court is able to review only those 
issues already raised in the deportation hearing and which are part of the 
administrative record. 149 
Once the refugee is determined to be deportable, the statute provides that 
the refugee 
shall be directed by the Attorney General to a country promptly 
designated by the alien if that country is willing to accept him ... 
unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, concludes that de-
portation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of 
the United States. No alien shall be permitted to make more than 
one such designation .... 150 
Recent case law extends the Attorney General's power "from the power to 
reject a designated country to the power to name the country to which the alien 
shall be deported."151 The rationale and consequences of this holding will be 
discussed below. 
B. Defenses to Deportation 
The statute also provides defenses to deportation. Given the definitional 
limitations of these defenses, however, it seems unlikely that they would be 
available to PIRA activists. One defense requires a showing that the alien's 
deportation would result in extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen spouse, parent, 
or child. 152 The statute narrows the applicability of this defense by requiring 
that the alien's admission cannot be "contrary to the national welfare, safety, or 
security of the United States."153 The statute also provides that the Attorney 
General has the discretion to accept or deny this particular defense. 154 Given 
the familial requirements and the discretionary elements surrounding this de-
1-17 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(l) (1982). 
148 Biggin v. INS, 479 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1973). 
149 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1982). 
1;0 INA, supra note 140, at § 243,8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). The Attorney General is charged with 
the administration of the INA, under INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1l03(a) (1982). The Attorney General 
has delegated his exclusive authority over immigration procedures to the INS, which is a division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. § 100.2(a) (1986). 
151 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1986). For a discussion supporting the validity of 
this power, see infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text. 
152 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1982). 
153 [d. 
154 [d. 
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fense, it is arguable that PIRA members would find it difficult to escape depor-
tation under this defense. 
A second defense involves a "withholding of deportation" proceeding, which 
is valid if the Attorney General determines that "the alien would be subject to 
persecution on the account of ... nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion .... "155 The statute provides several exceptions to 
this rule: if the alien participated in the persecution of any person on account 
of religion, nationality, or political opinion, then he or she will not be allowed 
the protections of withholding deportation. '56 Another exception occurs when 
there is serious reason to believe that the alien committed a "serious nonpolitical 
crime" outside the United States before arriving in the United States.157 
Hence, given these exceptions, the Attorney General's determination as to 
whether PIRA activities are political may not be determinative. In either case, 
the refugee is likely to be unable to use the defense of withholding of depor-
tation. 
A third defense to deportation is an application for political asylum. '5s To 
gain asylum, the petitioner must prove that he or she is a "refugee," which the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)159 defines as an alien "who is unable or 
unwilling to return to ... [his or her] country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of ... nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion."'6o Once a "well-founded fear of 
persecution"'61 has been established, the Attorney General may, in his or her 
155 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984), where the Supreme Court 
interpreted the standard related to the alien's burden of proof of "clear probability" to be that it is 
"more likely than not" that he or she will be persecuted. Jd. The court in McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 
1312,1315 (1981) held that the following factors must be demonstrated by the alien in order to obtain 
withholding of deportation: 
Jd. 
(I) A likelihood of persecution; i.e., a threat to life or freedom. 
(2) Persecution by the government or by a group which the government is unable to control 
[of which PIRA is a member]. 
(3) Persecution resulting from petitioner's political beliefs. 
(4) The Petitioner is not a danger or security risk to the United States. 
156 8 U.S.c. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982). Other exceptions include: 
(h)(2)(B): the alien having been convicted of a particular serious crime, constitutes a danger 
to the community of the United States; 
(h)(2)(D): there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security 
of the United States. 
Jd. Note, one valid ground for refusal to withhold is sufficient. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 599 
n.14 (9th Cir. 1986). 
157 8 U.S.C. § l253(h)(2)(c) (1982). For one court's definition of "serious nonpolitical crime," see 
infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
158 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). 
159 Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982». 
160 INA, supra note 140, at § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.c. § llOl(a)(42) (1982). 
161 Jd. The Supreme Court has not defined "well founded fear," but has elusively described it as 
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discretion, grant asylum. 162 Again, however, the asylum procedure is not appli-
cable if the alien participated in any persecution of persons based on, among 
other things, their religion, nationality, or political opinion. 163 
C. The PIRA Cases in a Deportation Context 
Bence, under current law, a PIRA flctivist who has fled to the United State~ 
may be deportable simply because of hi~ or her membership in PIRA.164 Further, 
membership in PIRA disqualifies the refugee from taking advantage of the 
defenses afforded under the INA, and hence the refugee may be deportabJel6!i 
to a country that must be agreeable with the Attorney General. Thus was the 
fate of three of the four PIRA refugees originally found to be un-extraditable l66 
(the fourth, Quinn, was a U.S. citizen, and hence not deportable). 
1. McMullen 
In the McMullen case, the defendant illegally obtained a non-immigrant tem-
porary visa to enter the United States under the name of Kevin O'Shaugh-
nessy.167 Without valid paperwork, the defendant was in statutory violation of 
U.S. ill1migration law, rendering him deportable. 16B Upon his arrival in the 
United States, however, McMulleQ contacted the Burea\1 of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms with the hope of bartering his knowledge of PIRA activities in 
exchange for permission to stay in the United States. 169 After cooperating with 
the authorities, McMullen raised both the withholding of deportation and asy-
lum defenses at his subsequent deportation hearing. 
McMullen testified that the PIR,A knew of his cooperation with the authorities. 
He also testified that he was in danger of being murdered if the United States 
"more gen"rous than the 'clear probability of persecution standard .... '" INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 
425 (1984). 
162 The granting of asylum is discretionary under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). Because of tltis discre-
tionary nature, the INS must consider any application for asylum as a parallel application for with-
halding of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1983). 
163 8 U.S.C. § 1I01(a)(42) (1982). According to Sarvia Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393 n.3 
(1985). decisions denying asylum ilfe reviewed under a two-part standard. To be determined first is 
whether substantial evidence supports the determination that an alien h<\s failed to prove a weil-
founded f"ar or persecution. If th" alien does indeed prove this, the court then must review the denial 
for abuse of discretion. Id. 
164 See supra notes 127-31. 
165 Assuming that the refugee's departure will not cauSe extreme hardship \0 a U.S. citizen parent. 
spouse. or chUd. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1982). 
"'6 See IRA Suspect. supra note 14; McMullen v. INS. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986); Doherty v. Meese, 
808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 19116). 
167 McMullen. 788 F.2d at 593. 
"'8Id. This was in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982). 
169Id. For a discussion on asylum. see supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
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deported him to Ireland. 170 The Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed, holding that 
McMullen was not deportable since he would suffer persecution within the 
meaning of the INA.171 The BIA subsequently reversed the IJ, stating that 
McMullen had not established a significant "likelihood that he would suffer 
persecution upon deportation."172 The U.S. Court of Appeals 'for the Ninth 
Circuit initially reversed the BIA, holding that McMullen had demonstrated the 
requisite "probable persecution" to withhold deportation, and then on review 
of remand, upheld the BIA's second decision. 173 
The court first considered the validity of the BIA's denial of McMullen's 
application for withholding of deportation. The BIA made the denial on the 
basis of "serious reasons for considering that [McMullen] ... committed a 
serious nonpolitical crime."I74 The court defined "nonpolitical crime" as one 
which "was not committed out of 'genuine political motives,' was not directed 
toward 'the modification of the political organization or ... structure of the 
state,' and in which there is no direct 'causal link between the crime committed 
and its alleged political purpose and objecL"'175 The court went on to hold that 
even if the crime is determined to be "political" under that definition, a crime 
is nonetheless considered "serious" and "nonpolitical" if it is "disproportionate 
to the objective, or if it is 'of an atrocious or barbarous nature."'176 
McMullen argued that in determining whether his acts were "political" for 
purposes of withholding deportation, the BIA should not weigh the nature of 
the offenses against the political ends sought to be achieved. 177 To do so, he 
argued, would be impermissible under the political offense doctrine that has 
evolved in extradition cases. 17S Instead, McMullen argued that the Castioni in-
cidence test was appropriate. 179 
The court refused to treat the standard for the political nature of an offense 
in the deportation context as that used in the extradition contexLISO The court 
emphasized that in deportation, unlike extradition, only the United States apd 
the alien are parties to the action, with no other sovereign directly involved. lSI 
Hence, the concern of extradition, i.e. "that we should be careful not to interfere 
170 McMullen, 788 F.2d at 593. 
171Id. 
172 Id. 
mId. 
174 Id. at 594. This was in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(c) (1982). 
175 Id. at 595 (citing G. GOODwiLL-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-61 (1983». 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 596. 
178 Id. 
179 !d. For a review of the Castioni test, see supra text accompanying notes 58-61. 
180 McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1986). 
181Id. 
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with political processes in other cultures," does not apply.182 Because deportation 
technically involves only the expulsion of an undesirable alien from the United 
States, there can be no interference with an "internal struggle" of another 
nation. 183 Thus, the court indicated that the balancing approach used by the 
BIA was appropriate. 
The court agreed with the BIA in finding that the PIRA's acts of random 
violence against civilians and terrorist use of explosives were (1) insufficiently 
linked to their political objective and (2) qualified as acts of an atrocious nature, 
out of proportion to the political goal of achieving a unified Ireiand. 184 Having 
determined that the PIRA's acts were not political, the court then went on to 
agree with the BIA that there were "serious reasons" to believe that McMullen 
participated in these crimes. 185 In doing so, the court indicated that McMullen 
had met the lenient standard of "probable cause" by admitting to active mem-
bership in the PIRA.186 
Finally, the court rejected McMullen's argument that because a magistrate in 
a previous extradition hearing found his acts to be political, the court should 
so find in a deportation hearing. 187 The court based its determination on the 
fact that extradition determinations have no res judicata effect in subsequent 
judicial proceedings. 188 Hence, in light of this conclusion, withholding of de-
portation was properly denied. Because that mandatory relief was unwarranted, 
the court found that there were sufficient grounds to support the Attorney 
General's discretionary denial of asylum. ls9 Thus, the court held McMullen to 
be deportable. 190 
2. Doherty 
The most recent PIRA case l91 involved Joseph Patrick Doherty. After U.S. 
courts found Doherty to be un-extraditable, the U.S. government returned him 
to the INS pursuant to a deportation warrant. 192 In fact, the INS charged 
Doherty with five grounds for deportation: (1) lack of proper paperwork,193 (2) 
conviction of a crime of moral turpitude,194 (3) conviction of two crimes within 
182 [d. (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
18:\ Id. 
184 [d. at 598. 
".i [d. at 599. 
Jt\6{d. 
187 [d. at 597. 
IH8 Id. See supra note 37. 
18'i [d. at 600. 
19U Id. 
\91 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986). 
19, Id. at 939. 
19:1 [d. at 940. See supra note 127. 
\'., [d. See supra note 128. 
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an aggregate sentence of five years or more,195 (4) entering the United States 
for the purpose of engaging in activities which are "prejudicial to the public 
interest, or would endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United 
States,"I96 and (5) advocating the necessity of the unlawful assaulting or killing 
of any officer of an organized government because of the officer's official 
character. 197 
When the U.S. government filed an action seeking review of the judge's denial 
of extradition, Doherty moved for a stay of his deportation proceedings pending 
the outcome of the action. Doherty, however, subsequently moved to withdraw 
his application for discretionary relief of deportation. He then admitted to 
being deportable due to a lack of valid immigration documents '98 and sought 
immediate deportation, designating Ireland as his desired destination. '99 
Doherty's reasoning behind this action was likely based upon the existence of 
the Supplementary Treaty, which was on the verge of being ratified. 20o Since 
the Treaty would eradicate the political offense exception retroactively, Doherty 
would be subject to extradition to the United Kingdom. 20' Doherty faced a life 
sentence in the United Kingdom, while in Ireland (based on a dual prosecution 
agreement between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), he faced 
only a ten-year sentence. 202 
The Attorney General and the INS opposed Doherty's chosen destination on 
the ground that, "deportation to the Republic of Ireland would be prejudicial 
to the interests of the United States in its relations with other nations concerning 
the fight against international terrorism."203 The Attorney General then, in a 
unique move, argued that he had the authority to redesignate the United 
Kingdom as the country to which Doherty would be deported. 204 The Attorney 
General relied on the language of the INA which provides that the Attorney 
General shall direct the deportation of an alien to a country designated by the 
alien unless, in the Attorney General's discretion, deportation to that country 
"would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."205 The court held 
195 Id. See supra note 129. 
196Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982). 
197 /d. See supra note 130. 
198 This is a violation of 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(20) (1982). 
199 Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1986). Doherty was able to designate his destination 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). Id. 
200/d. 
201Id. 
202Id. 
203Id. at 940-41. The Attorney General's opposition was based on the INA, supra note 140, at § 243, 
8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). For the statute's language, see supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
204 /d. at 941. 
205Id. INA § 243, 8 U.s.C. § 1253(a). 
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that such language seemed to suggest that once the alien had made one choice 
which was rejected, the next choice would belong to the Attorney Genei'al,206 
Doherty argued that never before had the Attorney General opposed a de-
portee's chosen destination based on such designation being prejudicial to the 
interests of the United States and that this lack of precedent rendered the INS's 
argument "baseless and frivplous.''207 The U.S. Court of Appeals flatly disa-
greed, holding th~t, to the contrary, "the novelty of the issue raised makes this 
case a particularly inappropriate occasion for judicial intervention in the ad-
ministrative process."208 
Through novel and expansive language, the court then made the bold state-
ment that the "implied corollary to the Attorney General's power to reject a 
designated country is the power to name the country to which the alien shall be 
deported, subject of course, to that country's willingness to accept the alien."209 
The court explained that it reviews the Attorney General's decision with enor-
mous deference.210 Specifically, the issue is "whether there is any reasonable 
foundation at all for the Attorney General's actions."211 The court explained that 
this deference is rooted in the fact that as a "politically responsible official," the 
Attorney General analyzes each particular deportation's impact on the United 
States as a whole, with respect to foreign relations.212 The court held that it has 
no place to interfere with decisions made by the political branches of govern-
me;'t.213 In a final proclamation of its virtually absolute deference, the court 
stated, "apart from claims such as 'fraud, absence of jurisdiction, or unconsti-
tutionality,' the determination of the Attorney Generai is essentially unreview-
able."214 
In analyzing the validity of the court's decision regarding the implied power 
of the Attorney General, it is important to note that no directly supportive 
precedent exists. As Doherty argued, the Attorney General has never before 
disapproved of a deportee's chosen destination. 215 Furthermore, never before 
206 Doherty v. Mee&e, 808 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1986). 
2071d: at 941 n.3. 
2081d. 
20. ld. at 941 (emphasis supplied). 
210 [d. at 942. 
211 ld. (emphasis supplied), 
2121d. at 943. . 
213 [d. (citing the Supreme Court in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-89 (1952)) ("Any 
polity toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to 
thl' conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 
government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to 
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. "). 
214 Doherty v. hf"ese; 808 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing K. DAVis, 5 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE, 28:2 at 257 (2d ed. 1984». 
2151d. at 941 n.3. 
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had any court validated the authority of the Attorney General to determine 
where, in that case, the deportee would subsequently go. 
The court's decision that the Attorney General should ~hoose the new desti-
nation is, however, arguably supported by a plain reading of the statute. The 
INA provides the Attorney General with the discretion to disallow an alien's 
choice if to do so would be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States."216 
Significantly, the INA goes on to say that the deportee can make orily one 
designation. 217 Thus, should deportees choose a designation that is unaccepta-
ble, they may not choose another, as their rights under th~ INA have been 
exhausted. Since the only parties involved in a deportation proceeding are the 
alien and the Attorney General, it follows that the only other party able to make 
another designation is the Attorney General. 
The legal history of the development of deportation law also lends support 
to the Doherty court's conclusion. Deportees' rights, with respect to determining 
their destination, originated in the right to challenge the place of deportation 
already chosen by immigration officials.218 This was accomplished through a 
writ of habeas corpus. The Internal Security Act of 1950219 (1950 Act) greatly 
extended the rights of deportees, providing that, "deportation of aliens ... shall 
be directed by the Attorney General to the country specified by the alien, if it 
is willing to accept him .... "220 However, even this permissive Act went on to 
provide that if the country was unwilling to accept the alien, then "such depor-
tation shall be directed by the Attorney General within his discretion."221 
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (1952 Act)222 irHroduced changes 
which indicated that Congress intended to cljrtail deportees' rights with respect 
to choosing their ultimate destination. 223 One court, in analyzing the provisions 
of the 1952 Act, recognized that it introduced new requirements that (1) the 
alien's choice be made promptly; (2) the alien be given only one choice; (3) that 
choice be restricted if to "foreign territories contiguous to the United States or 
adjacent islands;" (4) the choice can be disregarded if the designated country 
216 8 U .S.C. § 1253(a) (1982). 
217Id. 
218 See, e.g., U.S. ex reI. Mensevich v. Tod, 264 U.S. 134 (1924) (Alien objected to being sent to 
Poland when prior to his emigration to the United States, he was a resident of Russia); U.S. ex reI. 
Karamian v. Curran, 16 F.2d 958, (2d Cir. 1927) (Alien objected to being sent to Persia when he was 
willing to voluntarily depart for France); U.S. ex reI. Chow Yee Tung v. Harrison, 143 F.2d 128, (2d 
Cir. 1944) (Alien objected to being sent to Great Britain since he had no connection with that country). 
219 Internal Security Act, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 984 (1950). 
220 /d. at § 23. 
22IId. 
222 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.s.C. (1982». 
223 U.S. ex reI. Scala Di Felice v. Shaughnessy, 114 F. Supp. 791, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("Many changes 
have been introduced by the Act and it is plain on the face of the statute that Congress intended to 
circumscribe the right of aliens about to be deported in choosing the place of their deportation."). 
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does not respond within three months; and (5) the Attorney General be given 
the discretion to ignore the alien's choice if "deportation to the country chosen 
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. "224 Given the 1952 
Act's apparent shifting of power from the alien to the Attorney General, it 
follows that the Attorney General's power, post 1952, is at least as broad as the 
more restrictive 1950 Act that the INA supercedes. 
The counter argument, however, can be made that since the 1952 Act does 
not specifically state the consequences of an inappropriate designation, that in 
itself is evidence that Congress did not intend the Attorney General to choose 
another destination. Since the 1950 Act specifically directed that an alien's 
inappropriate choice would be followed by the Attorney General's choice, the 
absence of such language in the 1952 Act may indicate that Congress intention-
ally revoked that power of the Attorney General. 
If the correct interpretation of the 1952 Act gives the Attorney General the 
power to name the alien's destination, then deportation procedures have the 
ability to effectuate the same results as extradition. For example, if future PIRA 
activists were to arrive in the United States, it is conceivable that upon finding 
that a refugee lacks the proper paperwork, the Attorney General could routinely 
reject that refugee'S designated country for any discretionary reason and des-
ignate the United Kingdom as the final destination. 
VII. EXTRADITION OF U.S. CITIZEN PIRA ACTIVISTS UNDER THE 1972 
TREATY 
Just as recent PIRA deportation cases suggest that the Supplementary Treaty 
is superfluous to the effort to return Irish PIRA members to the United King-
dom, a PIRA extradition case dealing with a U.S. citizen, who is not deportable, 
also suggests that the Supplementary Treaty is superfluous. 
In Quinn v. Robinson,225 Quinn was a U.S. citizen charged with the PIRA-
related murder of a London police officer and conspiracy to cause six bombing 
incidents in England. Initially, a magistrate found him to be un-extraditable, 
and a district court ultimately overruled that decision. 226 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding Quinn extraditable because his acts failed to satisfy 
224 Id. 
225 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986). 
226Id. at 785-86. The procedural history of the case explains the right to appeal. Initially, the U.S. 
magistrate held Quinn to be extraditable. Quinn then filed a writ of habeas corpus, and upon review, 
the district court held that Quinn's actions did fall into the POE of the 1972 treaty. Hence, he was 
held unextraditable. /d. at 785-86. Because this decision was made by a district court rather than a 
magistrate, a right of appeal exists. 
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the incidence test. 227 While the outcome of the case undoubtedly supports the 
premise that the Supplementary Treaty was unnecessary, it is the dicta contained 
in the majority and concurring decisions that most directly substantiates that 
premise. 
Specifically, the court stated that historically the POE was designed "to protect 
those seeking to change their own government or to oust an occupying power 
that is asserting sovereignty over them. We question whether it should apply 
when the accused is not a citizen of the country or territory in which the uprising 
is occurring."228 Judge Fletcher, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the ma-
jority's supposition, stating that "mercenaries or volunteers in a foreign conflict" 
probably were not covered by the POE absent "tangible and substantial con-
nections" with the uprising country.229 
This conclusion may be supported through the consideration of the POE's 
purpose and origin. As mentioned earlier, the POE was formulated to address 
the revolutionary who unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow an oppressive 
regime.230 One court has defined a revolutionary as "one who instigates or 
favors revolution," or one taking part therein. 231 Another court has defined 
revolution as "a complete overthrow of the established government in any 
country or state by those who were previously subject to it,"232 and a "funda-
mental change in political organization, or in a government, or constitution; ... 
or renunciation of one government or ruler, and substitution of another by the 
governed."233 From these definitions, it appears as though only nationals may 
qualify as revolutionaries, since a country's government governs only its nation-
als. 
At least two decisions lend direct support to this conclusion.234 In Kjar v. 
Doak,235 the defendant was a Danish citizen who was a member of the Com-
munist Party. Because that particular party advocated the violent overthrow of 
227Id. at 813-14. The ultimate issue to be resolved was whether the POE applied to the PIRA 
activities that Quinn is alleged to have performed. Because all of the charged offenses took place in 
England, yet were related to the uprising in Northern Ireland. the offenses were characterized as 
international acts. The court specifically held that the "uprising" component of the incidence test does 
not extend beyond the borders of the territory or country in which a group of residents or citizens is 
seeking to change their particular government. Because the court concluded that the uprising did not 
extend to England. the incidence test was not satisfied. Hence. Quinn could not invoke POE and was 
held extraditable to the United Kingdom. Id. 
228Id. at 808 (emphasis supplied). 
229Id. at 820. 
23. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. 
231 Gitlow v. Kielly. 44 F.2d 227. 233 (D.C.N.Y. 1930). 
232Id. at 232-33. 
23, U.S. v. Schneiderman. 106 F. Supp 906. 938 (D.C. Cal. 1952). 
234 Kjar v. Doak. 61 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1932); United States v. Tapolcsanyi. 40 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 
1930). 
235 61 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1932). 
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the United States government, the court directly addressed the general "right" 
of a foreign national to contribute to a domestic revolution. While the defendant 
argued that the right of revolution is inherent in every individual, regardless 
Of citizenship, the court flatly disagreed, holding, "[t]hat right, if it exists, 
depends upon where such individual attempts to operate in his effort to effect 
such right. Revolution presupposes an antagonism between a government and 
its nationats, not between a government and its aliens."236 
In a similar fact situation, the court in United States v. Tapolcsanyi237 commented 
on an alien's right to bring about governmental change through the promotion 
of communist propaganda in the United States. In holding that there was no 
such right, the court stated, "[ w ]hile no one may be deeply attached to every 
provision of the Constitution and while all citizens have a right to work for its 
amendment in an orderly way, that is a right of a citizen . ... As an alien, he 
[defendant] had ho such right."238 
If the Quinn court's supposition is an accurate reflection of how future courts 
will interpret the POE when applied to U.S. citizens who are requested for 
crimes committed abroad, then the Supplementary Treaty may have been an 
unnecessary effort. That is, under the ptovisions of the 1972 Treaty and current 
immigration law, all PIRA activists who flee to the United States are already 
subject to delivery to the United Kingdom. 
VIII. THE PROPRIETY OF USING DEPORTATION WHEN EXTRADITION Is 
UNAVAILABLE 
Given that deportation may produce the same result as a successful extradi-
tion, the question remains as to the extent to which deportation may properly 
be used when extradition is unavailable. While the Doherty court employed 
deportation measures to send Doherty back to the U.K., the propriety of such 
a tactic may be questionable. This is because deportation and extradition are 
rooted in different ideologies. 
The Supreme Court, in Fong Vue Ting v. United States,239 has explained that, 
"strictly speaking ... 'extradition' and 'deportation,' although each has the effect 
of removing a person from the country, are different things, ahd have different 
purposes."240 The Court explained that the main purpose of deportation is to 
remove an alien from a country "simply because his presence is deemed incon-
sistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or 
236Id. at 569 (emphasis supplied). 
237 40 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1930). 
"'BId. at 257. 
239 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
24oId. at 709. 
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contemplated; either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent or 
under those of the country to which he is taken."24l In comparison, the Court 
noted that extradition is "the surrender to another country of one accused of 
an offence against its laws, thete to be tried, and, if found guilty, ptinished."242 
It is because of these basic ideological differences that deportation can never 
be a proper substitute for extradition. 
The legality of following up an unsuccessful extradition request with a de-
portation proceeding can; however, be substantiated in the excl\lsivity of de-
portation and extradition iaw. Because the purpose and function of deportation 
is distinct from those of extradition, an individual who lawfully avoided extra-
dition may very well qualify for deportation.243 The alien's deportability indi-
cates that for one rea~on or another, he or she is not a person whom the United 
States wishes to harbor. Accordingly, it is irrelevant that for extradition ptit-
poses, the courts allowed the alien to remain in the United States. Supporting 
this conclusion is the fact that extradition proceedings have no res judicata 
effect. 244 
Nevertheless, at least one critic refers to the deportation of un-extraditable 
aliens as "disguised extradition."245 This critic challenges that this use of depor-
tation is improper since it circumvents an "internationally recognized process" 
that assures "the surrender of fugitive offenders between states."246 The weak-
ness in this argument, however, is that according to the respective bodies of 
law, an alien may simultaneously be protected under extradition law and in 
violation of immigration law. Thus, this critic concedes that even if such dis-
guised extradition is arguably a less-than-proper use of deportation, it never-
theless "occurs in the exercise of a sovereign right, i.e. the right of the State to 
expel undesirable aliens. Consequently, disgtiised extradition, in principle, is 
not a violation of international law. "247 Additionally, this critic recognizes that 
such a right is "in principle unlimited."248 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson addressed the practice of instituting depor-
tation procedures when extradition is unavailable in a letter to Senator Johnson 
dated Det. 20, 195 J.249 Describing the relationship between the two procedures, 
he wrote: 
241/d. 
2421d. 
243 For example. compare supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text with supra notes 125-63 and 
accompanying text. 
244 See supra note 37. 
245 C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION 52 (1980). 
2461d. at 56. 
247Id. 
248Id. 
249 M. WHITEMAN. supra note 32. at 750. 
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It is the practice of this Department [of State] to suggest to foreign 
governments the deportation of American citizens only when other 
procedures for effecting their return to the United States are not 
available. Extradition is the proper procedure to be employed in 
effecting the return from foreign countries of fugitives ... when 
there are treaties of extradition in force between the United States 
and the asylum country .... 250 
It follows that in the converse situation (where a foreign State requests that 
the United States return a fugitive to that foreign nation), the Department's 
practice would be to deport such fugitives to the requesting State only when 
there is no extradition treaty in existence. The PIRA cases themselves, however, 
demonstrate the contrary. Indeed, these cases indicate that deportation may be 
properly used when extradition efforts under an existing treaty fail. In fact, 
one commentator observed that this practice is quite common, stating that 
requests are frequently made by one State to another for the de-
portation ... of a person charged in the requesting State with crime. 
Most frequently, such requests are made where the circumstances 
are such that the State where he is accused is unable to demand his 
extradition under treaty and where his deportation ... might result 
in his being expelled directly to that State or to a State from which 
his extradition might be demanded under treaty.251 
Overall, while it may be argued that on some moral level, deportation should 
not be used to effectuate the results of extradition when extradition is unavail-
able, it may also be argued that to do so is perfectly legal. Because deportation 
and extradition are two discrete and insular bodies of law, the inapplicability of 
one proceeding does not necessarily invalidate the subsequent institution of the 
other. Thus, the deportation of an un-extraditable alien appears to be a legally 
sound practice. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Supplementary Treaty may have been an unnecessary measure. Given 
its general purpose of "combatting terrorism," the Treaty's immediate goal is 
to deter terrorism by delivering PIRA refugees found within the United States 
back to the United Kingdom for prosecution. This delivery is already possible 
for non-U.S. citizen PIRA refugees, as their PIRA actions are likely to deem 
them deportable. Further, the INA,252 along with a recent court decision,253 
~5() [d. 
251 [d. at 74S. 
252 Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of S U.S.C. (l9S2)). 
253 Doherty v. Meese, SOS F.2d 93S (2d Cir. 19S6). 
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indicate that the Attorney General has the final say as to the destination of that 
deportation. For those few PIRA activists who are U.S. citizens, hence not 
deportable, the POE's original purpose supports the proposition that the 1972 
Treaty was sufficient to guarantee their extradition. Since the POE was designed 
to protect unsuccessful revolutionaries, who by definition must be nationals, it 
most likely did not apply to U.S. citizens fighting for an Irish cause. 
Accordingly, while the Supplementary Treaty directly ensures that PIRA 
members could not escape prosecution by fleeing to the United States, it may 
have been a superfluous effort. Further, given the numerous negative ramifi-
cations of the Supplementary Treaty, it was arguably an unwise effort, as well. 
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